Plan: issuing signed level credentials

Implementation plan for Bob Rapp and Ken Johnston. This builds on CREDENTIALS.md. Bob accepted all five recommendations on 19 Nov 2026. Phase 1 uses public TEST keys only; Bob and Ken have agreed on the certificate titles; the signature images have not arrived.

The problem

Every learner who completes a level gets a certificate signed by Bob and Ken. Anyone, such as an employer, must be able to check that it is real in seconds, without contacting us and without seeing the learner's private work. Today:

Proposed solution

1. One credential record per learner per level, in an open standard. A JSON record in the Open Badges 3.0 format (W3C Verifiable Credential). Open Badges 3.0 is the free open standard for digital badges, so learners can carry the credential into wallets and onto LinkedIn, and no vendor holds it. It contains only the fields in CREDENTIALS.md: the name the learner chooses, the credential name, the level, the date, the public project title, the reviewing host, the receipt ID and the status URL. No email, quiz answers or project text. It is signed with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON. apps/sandbox400 already has JCS and Ed25519 code to reuse. Beacon's sorted-key form is not full JCS, as its own docs say.

2. Two signatures that mean different things.

3. A free verify page that works offline. A static page at verify.aigovops.org (the Foundation owns aigovops.org). The page reads the receipt ID from the QR code and checks the signature in the browser. It also checks a signed public status list that holds only receipt IDs and their status (valid, revoked or reissued), in the W3C Bitstring Status List format. It needs no server and no database, and keeps no learner data. It can launch on GitHub Pages at /how-ai-works/verify/ until the domain is pointed.

4. Issuance flow, human-gated.

  1. The host marks the level project as approved.
  2. The credential agent builds unsigned records for the cohort and opens a batch for review.
  3. Bob gives one "issue" yes per batch, the one irreversible click.
  4. A GitHub Action signs the records with the issuer key, held in 1Password and the Actions secret, and never in the repo. It then renders the certificates and updates the status list.
  5. Fo emails each learner their certificate PDF and JSON file.

5. Keys and failure handling. The issuer key is created once, in a short key ceremony with Bob present. Its public key is published at verify.aigovops.org/.well-known/ and in the repo. Rotating the key uses Beacon's keys.mjs current/retired model. If the key leaks, we rotate it, mark the affected records reissued and re-sign them. An errata or a credential found to be wrong is handled by revoking or reissuing it, never by silently editing it.

Phases

PhaseWhatWho signs offRough time
0Settle the decisions below and obtain signature imagesBob, KenDays, on your schedule
1Record schema, signer, verify page, status list and tests, all with test keysDevin builds; Devin Review; Bob merges1–2 days
2Certificate PDF/PNG renderer from the mockup, with signature imagesBob, Ken approve a proof1 day
3Key ceremony; publish the public key and the per-level authorizationsBob present; Bob and Ken sign1 hour
4Pilot: first Level 100 cohort, end to endHost marks projects; Bob issuesAfter the first Thursday cohort
5Open Badges wallet export and LinkedIn "Add to profile" linkBob1 day

Risks

Recorded decisions

#DecisionChosen approachRecorded state
1Record formatOpen Badges 3.0Decided by Bob, 19 Nov 2026
2Signing modelFoundation key plus a one-time Bob/Ken authorization per levelDecided by Bob, 19 Nov 2026
3Verify addressverify.aigovops.org; GitHub Pages until the domain is setDecided by Bob, 19 Nov 2026
4Signature imagesOne from each, on white (PNG or phone photo)Awaiting images from Bob and Ken
5Signatory titles on certificatesBoth “Founder and Co-chair, Review Board”Bob set the titles and relayed Ken's agreement, 20 Nov 2026
6Verifier address for real recordshttps://verify.aigovops.org/ itself, served from its own Pages repository (not /verify/ on this site). Real keys and real records are refused for any other baseDecided by Bob, 20 Nov 2026
7Proof suiteeddsa-rdfc-2022, the suite 1EdTech's certification guide lists, replacing eddsa-jcs-2022 before any real issuanceDecided by Bob, 20 Nov 2026
8Learner identifierKeep the per-record anonymous subject ID; no identifier field. Add a hashed identifier only if the official suite fails without oneDecided by Bob, 20 Nov 2026

Phase 1 implementation: apps/credentials/README.md. The QR carries the compressed credential in a URL fragment, not an ID lookup. Public bitstring status lists contain bits, not learner records or receipt IDs. These refine the proposal above.