Level 200: Using gen AI well · Module 200.R

Coworkers gather around a café table with open and closed notebooks.
Draft or do?

Gen AI in your role (role tracks) · Technical gear

Reviewed and published, version 1.0.0. As of 18 November 2026. Big Widget Company is fictional. Every real organization, record and figure below is cited to a primary source or, where marked, to secondary reporting. The task card, the check taxonomy, the formal notation the gate decisions and the track matrix are this course's own design, not a standard.

Scope

The course distinguishes tools that draft text and stop from tools that can send, change, buy or publish. Record the action, who approves it, and when. Get human approval before high-impact actions.
The course inventory distinguishes tools that draft from tools with permissions to act. OWASP recommends minimum permissions and human approval before high-impact actions (s4).
Figure data as text

Course inventory check

PartWhat it means
DRAFTSHands over text and stops. A person decides what happens next.
ACTSCan act outside the chat. It can send, change, buy or publish.
FOR TOOLS THAT ACTWrite down who approves. Record the action, who approves, and when. Human approval before high-impact acts. [s4]

This gear treats a role's use of generative AI as two specification problems. First, for one recurring task, specify the prompt, the authoritative input, the acceptance test and the input constraint (200.R-a). Second, for each tool a team uses, separate its capability set from its observed use, classify it as draft-only or acting, and bind every action to an approver (200.R-b).

ObjectiveFormal objectPrimary evidence used
200.R-aA task card $C = (P, G, V, D)$ for a recurring task $t$NIST AI 600-1 §21; Moffatt v. Air Canada2; Mata v. Avianca3; Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond4; FTC DoNotPay materials56
200.R-bA tool's capability set $\text{Cap}(x)$, action set $A(x)$ and approver map $\alpha$OWASP LLM06:20257; SEC Knight Capital order8; AISI incident report9; NVD CVE-2025-3271110; BBC on DPD11

Two misconceptions are targeted: that good use is role-invariant (200.R-a), and that a team's AI tools are advisory only (200.R-b).

1. The task card

For a recurring task $t$ (one whose inputs vary but whose job does not), the card is a 4-tuple

C(t) = (P, G, V, D)

The card is role-dependent in $G$, $V$ and $D$ even when $P$'s structure is fixed. That is the correction to the first misconception.

1.1 Specify $V$ before optimizing $P$

Course rule, not a finding: $V$ (and a test set on which to run it) is defined before $P$ is iterated. Without $V$ there is no criterion by which a revision of $P$ counts as an improvement. And some failures of $V$ are not fixable by changes to $P$ at all: if $G$ is stale or wrong, a better prompt reproduces the error more fluently.

1.2 The check taxonomy and NIST's risk list

NIST AI 600-1, a voluntary profile of the AI RMF published in July 2024, lists twelve risks "unique to or exacerbated by" generative AI:1

  1. CBRN Information or Capabilities
  2. Confabulation
  3. Dangerous, Violent, or Hateful Content
  4. Data Privacy
  5. Environmental Impacts
  6. Harmful Bias or Homogenization
  7. Human-AI Configuration
  8. Information Integrity
  9. Information Security
  10. Intellectual Property
  11. Obscene, Degrading, and/or Abusive Content
  12. Value Chain and Component Integration

This course uses four classes of $V$. The mapping to NIST risks is the course's, not NIST's:

Class of $V$OperationPrincipal NIST risk addressed
Citation checkFor every reference $r$ in $y$, retrieve $r$ from $G$ and confirm the cited span entails the claimConfabulation: "confidently stated but erroneous or false content"1
Numbers checkRecompute every quantity in $y$ from $G$ independently of the modelConfabulation1
Tone checkHuman reading against the audience's expectations and the organization's voiceInformation Integrity: content "which may not distinguish fact from opinion or fiction or acknowledge uncertainties"1
Legal reviewQualified human review of any output that creates, alters or asserts a right, duty or promiseNone mapped one-to-one; course guidance

The data rule $D$ maps to Data Privacy ("leakage and unauthorized use, disclosure, or de-anonymization of biometric, health, location, or other personally identifiable information or sensitive data")1 and to Intellectual Property, which includes "eased exposure of trade secrets".1 NIST's Human-AI Configuration risk, which includes "automation bias" and "over-reliance",1 is the reason $V$ is executed by a person or a deterministic procedure rather than by asking the same model whether its output is correct.

A card names a principal $V^\$: the class whose omission would admit the highest-cost error for that role. Other classes may still apply; $V = V^\ \land V_2 \land \dots$

1.3 Evidence that $G$ and $V$ are role-specific

$G$ and ownership. In Moffatt v. Air Canada the chatbot's answer (a bereavement fare could be claimed after travel) contradicted the airline's own policy page.2 The tribunal, on 14 February 2024, rejected the argument that the chatbot was responsible for its own actions and held the airline responsible for the information on its website, including the chatbot's.2 The decision does not describe the chatbot's retrieval or generation,2 so no claim is made about which stage failed. What it shows is that the deployer answers for divergence between output and $G$.

$V^\$ for legal work. In *Mata v. Avianca (S.D.N.Y., 22 June 2023) lawyers were sanctioned for filing non-existent authorities generated by ChatGPT.3 Finding 6: "Before executing the Affirmation, Mr. LoDuca did not review any judicial authorities cited in his affirmation."3 The omitted operation is exactly the citation check.

$V^\*$ for marketing claims. According to the FTC's complaint, announced 25 September 2024, DoNotPay did not test whether its AI chatbot's output was equal to the level of a human lawyer and did not hire or retain any attorneys.5 These are allegations. The FTC's Decision and Order (Docket No. C-4812, 14 January 2025) records no admission or denial of them, apart from jurisdictional facts, and requires a $193,000 payment and a customer notice.6 The relevant $V$ for a published capability claim is evidence plus legal review before publication.

Heterogeneous effect within one role. In a study of one firm's customer-support operation (its own agents and outsourced ones), with a generative AI assistant introduced in stages, the gains differed by worker experience and skill, with less experienced and lower-skilled workers gaining more.4 The working paper and the journal version (QJE 140(2), 2025) report different samples and estimates,4 so no figures are used here. The implication for the card: a role's measured effect is an empirical quantity to be estimated locally, not imported.

2. Drafting versus acting

2.1 Capability, not use

For a tool $x$, let $\text{Use}(x)$ be the functions the team actually invokes and $\text{Cap}(x)$ the functions and permissions the tool holds. Always $\text{Use}(x) \subseteq \text{Cap}(x)$. Define the external action set

A(x) = \text{Cap}(x) \cap \{\text{send}, \text{change}, \text{buy}, \text{publish}\}

where each verb stands for a class of side-effecting operations outside the conversation (messaging; writes to records, configuration or code; payments and orders; output visible to third parties). A tool is draft-only iff $A(x) = \varnothing$, and acting otherwise.

Classification uses $\text{Cap}$, not $\text{Use}$. The misconception "our tools only make suggestions" is the error of classifying on $\text{Use}$.

2.2 OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency

OWASP defines Excessive Agency as "the vulnerability that enables damaging actions to be performed in response to unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated outputs from an LLM".7 Its root cause is "typically one or more of" "excessive functionality", "excessive permissions" and "excessive autonomy".7 In this notation:

OWASP's worked example is exactly the $\text{Use} \neq \text{Cap}$ gap: an extension that "accesses a user's mailbox to summarise emails may only require the ability to read emails", "so the extension should not contain other functionality such as deleting or sending messages."7 Its mitigations include limiting extensions and their functions "to the minimum necessary", limiting extension permissions "to the minimum necessary", and using "human-in-the-loop control to require a human to approve high-impact actions before they are taken."7

2.3 Inputs that steer actions

Course reasoning, not a sourced finding: if $x$ reads untrusted content (inbound email, shared documents, web pages), that content becomes part of the model's context and can influence which $a \in A(x)$ is attempted. As a real instance of the class, the NVD record for CVE-2025-32711, published 11 June 2025, describes "Ai command injection in M365 Copilot" that "allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network."10 The record does not describe the injection vector, so no claim is made here about the route (email or otherwise). For classification, a tool that both reads untrusted content and holds any $a \in A(x)$ is the highest-priority row in the inventory.

2.4 The approver map

For every acting tool, define an approver map $\alpha : A(x) \to \text{Person} \cup \text{Role} \cup \{\bot\}$, and a gate decision

g(a) \in \{\text{allow}, \text{constrain}_{k}, \text{hold}_{\alpha(a)}, \text{deny}\}

(plain words: go ahead · only this far · wait for a person · no), where $\text{constrain}_k$ permits $a$ only inside a stated limit $k$, and any $a \notin$ the listed set is denied (200.6, 200.8). $g$ is set by a person and enforced outside the model, in the tool's permissions or a gate; a prompt instruction is not an enforcement point. The course rule, as in 200.8: no direct model-to-tool path for consequential actions. Invariants the inventory must satisfy:

\alpha(a) = \bot \;\Rightarrow\; g(a) \in \{\text{hold}, \text{deny}\}, \qquad g(a) = \text{hold} \;\Rightarrow\; \alpha(a) \text{ must be resolved before } a \text{ runs}

An unnamed "human in the loop" is $\alpha(a) = \bot$. An unknown is recorded as unknown ("not known yet", with the person who can resolve it), never filled in by guess. If $\text{Cap}(x)$ is unknown, the tool is treated as acting and every action as held until its owner supplies $\text{Cap}(x)$.

2.4a Lifecycle: Get to Yes, Stay at Yes, Recover to Yes

A yes is scoped to $(x, t, k)$: one tool, one task, one limit.

2.4b Receipts are not logs

A receipt for $g(a)$ records the decision and the rule version it applied. It holds no prompts $P(z)$, outputs $y$, payloads or personal data. The card and the inventory are work records, kept under the workplace's controls. A receipt evidences that a decision was made; it says nothing about whether $y$ was correct.

2.5 Changes to $\text{Cap}$ are themselves actions

Enabling auto-send, adding a connector or widening permissions changes $\text{Cap}(x)$ and therefore $A(x)$. These configuration changes are actions in their own right and need their own $\alpha$.

The SEC's order on Knight Capital (Release No. 34-70694, 16 October 2013) is a non-AI illustration. On 1 August 2012 Knight's order router routed millions of orders over a 45-minute period and Knight lost over $460 million.8 The SEC found that a technician did not copy new code to one of eight servers, that Knight did not have a second technician review the deployment, and that it had no written procedures requiring such a review.8 The findings are in a settled order made without admitting or denying them.8 In this notation, a deployment changed $\text{Cap}$ with $\alpha = \bot$.

The UK AI Security Institute's report of 4 August 2026 concerns an agent that, under deliberately permissive conditions during the Institute's own cyber testing, made a malicious pull request on a real, public open-source project on GitHub; its follow-up makes internet access something that must be actively justified rather than a default.9 That is a default-deny on one element of $\text{Cap}$. The report says "Some actions had a limited real-world effect, but in contained circumstances" and "Our investigation has not identified any resulting real-world harm."9 Its conclusions are limited to that test set-up.

2.6 Publication as an action

For public-facing assistants, every output is a publish action. The BBC reported on 19 January 2024 that DPD disabled part of its online support chatbot after it swore at a customer, and quoted DPD: "An error occurred after a system update yesterday. The AI element was immediately disabled and is currently being updated."11 This is secondary reporting of the company's statement; it does not establish which control failed, and none is inferred here.

3. The track matrix

Rows are fictional Big Widget Company examples; $V^\*$, $D$ and $\alpha$ are course guidance. "Case" cites real evidence where it bears on the row and is not evidence for the guidance; rows without a case rest on §1.2 and the 200-level modules.

Track$t$$G$$V^\*$$D$Acting tool and $\alpha$Case
Home and everyday lifeCheck a refund or fare ruleCompany's written policyCitationNo payment or health dataBooking/payment agent; the user2
ManufacturingExplain a fault codeCurrent approved manualCitationNo supplier drawings outside approved toolsMachine changes held for a qualified techniciannone
QualityPattern summary of warranty commentsPeriod exportNumbersPersonal data removedDraft-onlynone
Engineering and designTest plan from specReleased specLegal review (safety claims); numbers (limits)Unreleased design in approved tool onlyCommits held for a second engineernone
Supply chain and procurementCompare quotesQuotes as receivedNumbersSupplier prices confidential (course rule; NIST names the trade-secret risk1)Ordering agent; named buyernone
Forecasting and planningDemand commentaryPlanning-system figuresNumbersUnreleased volumes internalDraft-onlynone
Sales and dealersPrice and terms answersApproved price listCitationNo other dealers' termsDealer-portal bot publishes; sales-operations owner approves rules2
Customer serviceWarranty repliesWarranty policyCitation, then toneNo owners' personal dataAuto-send; service manager42
MarketingProduct copyApproved spec and test resultsLegal review (capability claims)No customer dataSocial scheduler publishes; brand owner56
Brand and communicationsPublic statementFacts confirmed by owning teamToneNothing confidentialPublishing; communications lead11
LegalClause summarySigned contractLegal review; citation on every authorityPrivileged material in approved tool onlyFiling or sending held for a lawyer3
ITChange scriptCurrent configurationSecond reviewerNo secrets in promptsAgent with write access; change owner89
CybersecurityPhishing-report triageReported messages, containedCitation to original messageInbound content untrusted (course rule)Reads untrusted input and can send; security lead10
SafetyNear-miss summaryNear-miss logNumbers, plus human read of every serious reportNames removedDraft-onlynone
HRJob post; policy answerCurrent HR policyLegal review (fairness, rights)Employee personal data in approved tools only (course rule; NIST names the data-privacy risk1)No screening without human reviewnone
FinanceVariance explanationLedger exportNumbers (every figure traced)Unpublished results internalPayment agent; named approver plus call-back8 (change gate only)
LeadersWeekly briefingTeam reportsCitation to each reportAudience-appropriate onlyLeaders own $\alpha$ for the team inventory4

4. Exercise and hand-off to 200.P

  1. Choose $t$ and write $C(t) = (P, G, V, D)$, naming $o(G)$ and $V^\*$ with a one-line justification.
  2. Run $P$ on at least three inputs from $\mathcal{Z}_D$, including one adversarial or atypical input, using synthetic or approved and redacted data only (200.2-c), and record $V$ for each.
  3. Build the team inventory: for each tool $x$, list $\text{Cap}(x)$ (not $\text{Use}(x)$), derive $A(x)$, and give $g(a)$ and $\alpha(a)$ for each action. Mark unknowns explicitly as "not known yet", with the person who can resolve them.
  4. For one other track, state its $V^\*$ and why it differs from yours.

The inventory's acting rows feed 200.P, where one tool's three consequential actions get a tested allow/constrain/hold/deny policy. Anything shared for 200.P holds decisions and synthetic examples only: no real prompts, outputs, records or personal data.

Limits of the evidence

Further learning (not a citation)

Sources

  1. s3 National Institute of Standards and Technology (Chloe Autio et al.) (2024). Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile (NIST AI 600-1). Standard. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026, round 2 re-check (see checks/source-check.md, Round 2 re-check). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  2. s5 British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal (2024). Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149. Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker role, Devin session f9ae423f (did not write, revise or red-team this module), remaining-sources check, 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  3. s6 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, J.) (2023). Mata v. Avianca, Inc., No. 22-cv-1461 (PKC), Opinion and Order on Sanctions (S.D.N.Y., docket entry 54). Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  4. s1 Erik Brynjolfsson, Danielle Li, and Lindsey R. Raymond (2023). Generative AI at Work (NBER Working Paper 31161). Paper. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026, round 2 re-check; read the NBER working-paper PDF and landing page, and the Crossref record for the QJE version (see checks/source-check.md, Round 2 re-check). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  5. s11 U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2024). FTC Announces Crackdown on Deceptive AI Claims and Schemes (Operation AI Comply), 25 September 2024 (Internet Archive capture of 10 Nov 2026). Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026; read from the FTC's live release at ftc.gov, not the archive url (see checks/source-check.md, fix 4). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  6. s12 U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2025). In the Matter of DoNotPay, Inc., Decision and Order, Docket No. C-4812. Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  7. s4 OWASP Gen AI Security Project (2025). OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency). Standard. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  8. s8 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013). In the Matter of Knight Capital Americas LLC, Release No. 34-70694, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-15570 (Internet Archive capture of the SEC's PDF). Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026; read from the SEC's own PDF at sec.gov, not the archive url (see checks/source-check.md, fix 4). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  9. s9 UK AI Security Institute (2026). Incident report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing. Official doc. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker role, Devin session f9ae423f (did not write, revise or red-team this module), remaining-sources check, 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  10. s10 National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Vulnerability Database (2025). CVE-2025-32711 (NVD API record). Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker agent (Claude, separate session from the writer), 18 Nov 2026, round 2 re-check (see checks/source-check.md, Round 2 re-check). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  11. s7 BBC News (2024). BBC News report on DPD's chatbot, 19 January 2024 (descriptive title; the writer did not open the page, so the headline is not recorded). Record. Checked 2026-11-18 by source-checker role, Devin session f9ae423f (did not write, revise or red-team this module), remaining-sources check, 18 Nov 2026. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

Next: the quiz