Level 300: Building with gen AI · Module 300.7

Three colleagues in a café booth read a thick grey binder; one points to a passage.
Know your role

The EU AI Act for builders · Technical gear

Reviewed and published, version 1.0.0. As of 18 Nov 2026. It is not a credential. Not legal advice. Article text is quoted from the Commission's AI Act Service Desk, which reproduces the EUR-Lex consolidated version as at 27 July 2026;1 the Official Journal texts (s1, s6) are authoritative. Big Widget Company is made up.

Objectives:

1. Duty families and their triggers

Step 1, RECORD · COURSE STEP: Write the as-of date. State the day you are answering for; do not use dates from memory. Step 2, CHECK · COURSE STEP: Open the current texts. Check the amending regulation in force and the Commission’s current page. Step 3, REPORT · COURSE STEP: Date each duty separately. More than one duty can apply. Write down what is not checked. Already on the market? Transition rules apply: not checked.
The course’s date-checking method, following the amendment and Commission overview discussed in the gear (s2). No application dates, legal classification or transition-rule conclusions are reproduced. Already on the market? Transition rules apply: not checked.
Figure data as text

Check the current dates

  1. RECORD · course step · Write the as-of date — state the day you are answering for; do not use dates from memory.
  2. CHECK · course step · Open the current texts — check the amending regulation in force and the Commission’s current page.
  3. REPORT · course step · Date each duty separately — more than one duty can apply. Write down what is not checked. Already on the market? Transition rules apply: not checked.

The method is the course’s; it follows the amending regulation and Commission overview discussed in the gear (s2).

Objective: 300.7-a. Text equivalent of figures/check-the-current-dates.svg.

The Commission frames the Act around four risk levels: unacceptable, high, transparency, and minimal or no risk, with no new rules for the last.2 Read that as "no additional requirements from the minimal-risk level", not "no duty": Art. 4 binds providers and deployers of AI systems without reference to a risk level.1 For an engineer the useful model is not a single classifier output but a set of predicates, each with its own trigger and date:

FamilyTriggerProvisions
AI literacyActor is a provider or deployer of an AI system. Duty: "shall take measures to support the development of AI literacy" of staff and others operating or using the systems on their behalfArt. 41
Prohibited practicesThe practice is listed, e.g. inferring "emotions of a natural person in the areas of workplace and education institutions", save "for medical or safety reasons"; several points carry their own exceptions or conditionsArt. 5(1)1
High-riskArt. 6(2): "AI systems referred to in Annex III shall be considered to be high-risk", subject to the Art. 6(3) derogation; Art. 6(1) and Annex I for safety components of regulated products, where both Art. 6(1) conditions hold13Chapter III
TransparencyInteracts directly with natural persons; generates or manipulates content; deploys deep fakesArt. 501
GPAI modelA model that "displays significant generality and is capable of competently performing a wide range of distinct tasks"Art. 3(63), Art. 531

The families are not mutually exclusive: Art. 6 keys on intended purpose,31 Art. 50 on interaction and output modality,1 Art. 4 on the actor's role.1 A system can satisfy several predicates, so the output is a set, not a label.

Art. 6(1a)–(1c), new. The Omnibus (Art. 1(8)) narrows "safety component", including for the Annex I route: AI systems "solely used for non-safety related aspects of user assistance, performance optimisation, service efficiency, automation or convenience or quality control shall not qualify as safety components", unless their "failure or malfunctioning … would endanger health and safety" (6(1b)). 6(1c) excludes products that need third-party conformity assessment "solely due to risks other than risks to health and safety" from condition (b).4 Whether a real product component falls inside is a legal-owner question.

Art. 4 as amended. The Service Desk marks Art. 4 amended. Its first paragraph now reads that providers and deployers "shall take measures to support the development of AI literacy of their staff and other persons dealing with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf", taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education, training and the context of use, and "This obligation does not require providers or deployers to guarantee any specific level of AI literacy of any individual."1 The Commission dates the AI literacy obligations to 2 February 2025.2 Model it as an obligation to take measures, not as an outcome to certify.

The Art. 6(3) derogation. An Annex III system is not high-risk where "it does not pose a significant risk of harm to the health, safety or fundamental rights of natural persons" under the listed conditions, but "an AI system referred to in Annex III shall always be considered to be high-risk where the AI system performs profiling of natural persons".1 Applicant-scoring systems are likely to profile; treat the derogation as unavailable unless a legal owner documents otherwise.

Territorial scope (Art. 2(1)). In scope: providers placing systems on the Union market "irrespective of whether those providers are established or located within the Union"; deployers established or located in the Union; and third-country providers and deployers "where the output produced by the AI system is used in the Union".1 The Commission: the framework "applies to both public and private actors inside and outside the EU".5 Headquarters location alone does not resolve the predicate.

2. Resolving application dates

The 2024 Art. 113 set general application from 2 August 2026 and Art. 6(1) from 2 August 2027.3 Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI, 8 July 2026) replaced Art. 113 point (c) and dated certain new Art. 5 prohibitions.4 The consolidated Art. 113 now reads, in the parts that matter here:1

Art. 50 sits outside Chapters I to III and is not named in any amended point, so it falls under the general date; the Commission's FAQ states Art. 50 obligations "will become applicable on 2 August 2026".15 The dates have already moved once;2 re-resolve them against the amending regulation in force on every as-of date (course practice, not a quoted rule).

Legacy systems (Art. 111). The Omnibus also amended the transitions, so the table above is not a valid answer for a system already on the market. Two amended points, read in the amending text:4

The Omnibus also replaced Art. 50(7) (codes of practice).4 Not checked by this module: the rest of Art. 111, any system's eligibility for these transitions, and the effect of the 50(7) change. Resolve a legacy system's Art. 111 position with the legal owner before using the table.

A teaching sketch, as pseudo-code. It is not a duty resolver or a legal classifier: it models Art. 4, Art. 5, Art. 6(1)/(2) and Art. 50(1)/(2) only, and it says so in its output. Every date must come from the amending regulation in force or the consolidated text, never a 2024 copy:

NOT_MODELLED = [
    "Art. 53 GPAI model duties (upstream)",
    "Art. 50(4) deployer disclosure (deep fakes, public-interest text)",
    "Art. 26 deployer duties; Art. 25 role transfers",
    "Art. 111 transitions for systems already on the market",
    "exceptions and conditions inside Arts. 5 and 50",
]

def duty_sketch(system, as_of):
    """Illustration only. An empty duty list must never be read as 'no duties'."""
    if not system.scope_resolved:          # Art. 2(1): EU market, EU deployer, or output used in EU
        return {"duties": [], "not_checked": ["Art. 2 scope: ask the legal owner"] + NOT_MODELLED}
    out = [("AI literacy measures", date_for("Art. 4"))]                  # every provider/deployer
    if is_prohibited(system.intended_use):                                # Art. 5
        out.append(("prohibited", date_for("Art. 5", system.intended_use)))
    if annex_i_safety_component(system):                                  # Art. 6(1): both conditions
        out.append(("high-risk, Annex I", date_for("Art. 113(c)(ii)")))   # 2028-08-02 as amended
    if in_annex_iii(system.intended_use) and not derogation_documented(system):  # Art. 6(2), 6(3)
        out.append(("high-risk, Annex III", date_for("Art. 113(c)(i)")))  # 2027-12-02 as amended
    if system.interacts:                                                  # Art. 50(1)
        out.append(("transparency: AI interaction notice", date_for("Art. 50")))
    if system.generates:                                                  # Art. 50(2)
        out.append(("transparency: machine-readable marking", date_for("Art. 50")))
    duties = [(d, when, "in application" if when <= as_of else "not yet") for d, when in out]
    return {"duties": duties, "not_checked": NOT_MODELLED}

Design notes. The function never returns a bare empty list: the not_checked field travels with every answer, so a consumer cannot mistake "outside this sketch" for "no duties". The helper predicates (is_prohibited, annex_i_safety_component, in_annex_iii, derogation_documented) are where the legal judgement lives; in a real build each one is a recorded answer from a named legal owner, not code.

Worked case, as of 2026-11-18. A Big Widget CV screener that also chats with EU applicants. Big Widget builds and uses it, so Art. 4 attaches, in application since 2025-02-02.12 Recruitment is an employment use the Commission lists as high-risk ("CV-sorting software for recruitment");2 the high-risk set applies from 2027-12-02, a date set by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, not by the 2024 text.41 The chat triggers Art. 50(1), in application since 2026-08-02.5 Result: {AI literacy (in application), high-risk Annex III (not yet), transparency (in application)}, plus the not_checked list for the legal owner.

3. Capacities: provider, deployer, or both

Definitions (Art. 3):1

Capacities are attributes of an actor relative to a system, not exclusive types. An in-house build used internally satisfies 3(3) via 3(11) "own use" and 3(4).1 The Commission's example separates them across two firms (a CV-screening tool's developer as provider, a bank using it as deployer),5 but nothing in the definitions forbids one firm holding both.

Role transfer (Art. 25). A distributor, importer, deployer or other third party "shall be considered to be a provider of a high-risk AI system" where it (a) puts "their name or trademark on a high-risk AI system already placed on the market or put into service", (b) makes "a substantial modification to a high-risk AI system", or (c) modifies "the intended purpose of an AI system, including a general-purpose AI system" so that it "becomes a high-risk AI system in accordance with Article 6".1 The initial provider then "shall no longer be considered to be a provider of that specific AI system for the purposes of this Regulation" (Art. 25(2), marked amended by the Omnibus on the Service Desk), with a duty to cooperate.1 Each limb has its own conditions; route the determination to the legal owner.

Upstream. Classify the model before assigning upstream duties: whether a bought model is a GPAI model is a 3(63) question ("significant generality"), not implied by the purchase.1

The classification and which supplier duties attach are legal-owner determinations; this module has not checked any real vendor.

Big Widget buildCapacityOne duty per capacity
Bought high-risk screener, used as suppliedDeployerArt. 26(2): oversight by persons "who have the necessary competence, training and authority"1
In-house hiring tool on a bought model, Big Widget-branded, used on own applicantsProvider and deployer1Provider: Art. 14 design for effective oversight. Deployer: Art. 26(6) retain logs "of at least six months"1
Vendor's high-risk tool relabelled as Big Widget'sProvider via Art. 25(1)(a)1Provider duties for that system, including Art. 12 logging capability1
A general-purpose assistant repurposed to rank applicantsProvider via Art. 25(1)(c), if it thereby becomes high-risk under Art. 61As above

Every row also carries Art. 4 for each capacity Big Widget holds.1

4. Article 50 transparency

Triggers and duty-holders:1

"Specific exceptions apply to all the transparency obligations mentioned."5

Dealer chat, Big Widget as provider. A persona with a name and avatar and no disclosure fails 50(1) unless AI interaction is obvious, which a human-styled persona works against.1 A notice rendered before the first model turn, as text (so screen readers can announce it; this helps with 50(5)'s accessibility clause but is not a full accessibility conformance test):

You're chatting with Big Widget's AI assistant, not a person. It can get things wrong.
To reach a person, type "agent".

Sentence one supplies the disclosure 50(1) asks for. Sentences two and three are course practice, not statutory text, and sentence three is only honest if a staffed handoff route exists. A correct notice answers one duty; it does not certify the system. Record that the notice was rendered per session as a content-free event (session id, notice version, timestamp), never the chat transcript; that record is your evidence it was shown.

5. Oversight and records for high-risk systems

Art. 14 (provider design duty). Systems are built so "they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during the period in which they are in use".1 Art. 14(4) requires that overseers be enabled, as appropriate and proportionate, to understand and monitor the system; to stay aware of over-reliance, "(automation bias)"; to interpret output; "to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system" "or to otherwise disregard, override or reverse the output"; and to "interrupt the system through a ‘stop’ button or a similar procedure" "that allows the system to come to a halt in a safe state".1

Art. 12 (logging capability). "High-risk AI systems shall technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system."1 Art. 12(2) gives the purpose: "In order to ensure a level of traceability of the functioning of a high-risk AI system" "that is appropriate to the intended purpose of the system", logging "shall enable the recording of events relevant for" identifying risk situations (Art. 79(1)) or substantial modification, post-market monitoring (Art. 72), and deployer monitoring (Art. 26(5)).1 Lifetime logging capability is not lifetime retention of all content.

Art. 26 (deployer duties). Use "in accordance with the instructions for use" (26(1)); assign oversight to persons with "competence, training and authority" (26(2)); "monitor the operation" (26(5)); keep the automatically generated logs "of at least six months, unless provided otherwise in applicable Union or national law" (26(6)); employers "inform workers’ representatives and the affected workers" before workplace use (26(7)); and "inform the natural persons that they are subject to the use of the high-risk AI system" (26(11)).1

Evaluating an oversight design. Score each setup on three properties derived from Art. 14(4): understand (output plus reasons visible to a named overseer), override (the overseer can reverse before effect), stop (a halt that leaves the system in a safe state). Only a design with all three meets the description.1 The course's every-recommendation gate is one way to get there, not a statutory workflow.

SetupUnderstandOverrideStop
Dashboard any HR user may openno named overseernono
Named recruiter sees rejections after they are sentpartlyno (already effective)no
Named, trained recruiter gates each recommendation with reasons; pause halts all sends; every action loggedyesyesyes

In gate terms, the third design returns hold (wait for a person) on every recommendation; the recruiter resolves it to allow, constrain or deny. Nothing reaches an applicant on the model's say-so.

Mapping to the operate gate (300.8).

Gate element (course)Act anchor (high-risk)
Named holder with expiring approvalArt. 26(2) assigned overseers with competence, training, authority1
Rubber-stamp detectionArt. 14(4)(b) automation bias1
Fail-closed stopArt. 14(4)(e) "halt in a safe state"1
Receipt per gate decision, holding no private contentArt. 12(1) automatic logs serving the Art. 12(2) purposes; Art. 26(6) retention1

The last row is an interface, not an equivalence. In this course a gate receipt carries hashes, the decision, the tier, the policy hash and the key id: no prompts, outputs, payloads or personal data. Art. 12(2) traceability may need richer event data. Keep that in a separately controlled log under the retention rules that apply, and treat "do our logs record the events 12(2) names?" as an open question for the legal owner, not something the receipt answers.

What the gate does not establish. Holding the gate is not AI Act compliance, now or when the high-risk dates arrive. A high-risk provider's obligations under Art. 16 include, among others:1

Two asymmetries follow. The gate is stricter in selected respects (approval expiry, content-free receipts, applied to every system), and silent on most of the list above. And the Act's Annex III high-risk duties are not in application until 2027-12-02.41 So build to the gate now as the course's operating habit, and run a separate, role- and use-specific gap assessment against the Act with the legal owner, including whether your actual logs give the traceability Art. 12(2) needs.

The NIST AI RMF is a voluntary, non-EU framework whose GOVERN and MANAGE functions cover similar ground; it creates no legal obligation and is not evidence of what the Act requires.6

6. Get to Yes, Stay at Yes, Recover to Yes

The course's lifecycle applied to an Act-scoped build. (Course framing, not the Act's.) A yes is scoped: this use, these users, this as-of date, this approver.

Decision rights. The gate decides each action; a named person releases holds; the legal owner decides how the Act applies. No model output, and no part of this course, makes that determination.

Receipts versus records. Shareable receipts hold metadata only, never CVs, transcripts, scores or personal data. Event logs needed for Art. 12 and Art. 26 are a separate controlled work record. (Course rule for receipts; the legal retention duty is Art. 26(6).)1

Unknowns. Emit "not checked" rather than an empty set, and route it to an owner.

7. Checklist

  1. Inputs: intended use, user and output location, as-of date.
  2. Duty set: Art. 4, Art. 5, Art. 6(1) and 6(2) with 6(3), Art. 50(1)/(2)/(4), GPAI upstream; each dated from the amending regulation in force and the Commission's current page.421
  3. Capacities per system: 3(3) with 3(11), 3(4), 25(1)(a)-(c).1
  4. Notice at first interaction, accessible;1 render recorded without content (course practice).
  5. Oversight properties (understand, override, stop) and log retention, mapped to the gate; the Art. 16 items the gate does not cover listed separately.1
  6. Unknowns written as "not checked" and routed to the legal owner.

Further learning (not a source for this module): University of Helsinki, Ethics of AI (https://ethics-of-ai.mooc.fi/, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0): background on accountability and review of automated decisions. It does not teach the Act.

Sources

  1. s4 European Commission, AI Act Service Desk (2025). AI Act Explorer. Official doc. Checked 2026-11-20 by source checker, round 4 re-check (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module); article pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 16, 25, 26, 50, 53, 111 and 113 re-opened. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  2. s2 European Commission (2024). AI Act (regulatory framework for AI). Official doc. Checked 2026-11-19 by source checker, round 3 re-check (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  3. s1 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act), Articles 3, 6, 14, 25, 26, 50, 53 and 113 (Official Journal text, archived copy). Official doc. Checked 2026-11-20 by source checker, round 5 re-check (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module); OJ text read via the Publications Office Cellar manifestation https://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/dc8116a1-3fe6-11ef-865a-01aa75ed71a1.0006.03/DOC_1, not the archive url. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  4. s6 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2026). Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Digital Omnibus on AI), 8 July 2026 (Official Journal text, archived copy). Official doc. Checked 2026-11-20 by source checker, round 5 re-check (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module); OJ text read via the Publications Office Cellar manifestation https://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/b459c07f-86fb-11f1-bf5e-01aa75ed71a1.0006.03/DOC_1, not the archive url. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  5. s3 European Commission (2024). Navigating the AI Act. Official doc. Checked 2026-11-19 by source checker, round 3 re-check (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module). ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
  6. s5 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2023). Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). Official doc. Checked 2026-11-18 by source checker (Claude Opus 5.5, separate session; did not write or edit this module). ↩

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